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Peru's 2011 Elections

A SURPRISING LEFT TURN

Steven Levitsky

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The results of Peru's 2011 presidential election caught most observers by surprise. Notwithstanding a booming economy, the two top finishers in the first-round contest on April 10 both came from outside the democratic establishment—Ollanta Humala, a left-leaning former military officer with dubious democratic credentials, and Keiko Fujimori, the daughter of imprisoned authoritarian ex-president Alberto Fujimori (1990–2000). Humala, whose radical populist appeal had nearly catapulted him to the presidency in 2006, won the June 5 runoff with 51.5 percent of the vote. Thus Peru, which had seemed certain to continue the pro-market and pro-U.S. orientation adopted by Fujimori in the 1990s and maintained by presidents Alejandro Toledo (2001–2006) and Alan García (2006–2011), joined Latin America's left turn.

Peru's left turn is particularly striking in light of developments since Humala first ran for the presidency in 2006. That year, the economy was just beginning to boom, and the victory of García—who ran as an antipopulist in that election—was widely attributed to this emerging economic success.¹ The boom continued under García: Boosted by soaring commodity prices, real GDP growth averaged more than 7 percent a year between 2006 and 2011. Incomes soared, and the official poverty rate declined from nearly 50 percent to 31 percent. Economic growth reinforced the emerging elite consensus around orthodox free-market policies. Thus as the 2011 election approached, it was widely assumed that Humala's constituency had shrunk and that, consequently, a pro-establishment candidate would win. As the campaign shifted into high gear, however, the two leading establishment candidates—former president Alejandro Toledo and the former mayor of Lima, Luis Castañeda

TABLE 1—RESULTS OF PERU’S 2011 ELECTIONS
(% OF VALID VOTE)

Party/Coalition	Presidential Candidate	Presidential Vote		Legislative Seats Won
		Round 1	Round 2	
Win Peru Alliance	Ollanta Humala	31.7	51.5	47
Force 2011	Keiko Fujimori	23.6	48.5	37
Alliance for the Great Change	Pedro Pablo Kuczynski	18.5	-	12
Peru Possible Alliance	Alejandro Toledo	15.6	-	21
National Solidarity Alliance	Luis Castañeda Lossio	9.8	-	9
Peruvian Aprista Party	None	-	-	4
Others	Others	0.7	-	0

Source: National Office of Electoral Processes (ONPE).

Lossio—faltered, while Humala surged. Much of Toledo’s support shifted to his former prime minister, Pedro Pablo Kuczynski (known as PPK), a prominent free-market economist who emerged as the darling of the Lima elite. Yet PPK’s candidacy never took off beyond Lima, and although his inroads into the middle-class vote sank Toledo, they were insufficient to catch Fujimori, who maintained a solid base among the poor. Thus Humala and Fujimori qualified for the runoff. Humala’s Win Peru coalition (47 seats) and Fujimori’s Force 2011 (37 seats) also finished first and second in the legislative vote, although neither captured a majority of the 130-member Congress (see Table 1 above).

Prior to the campaign’s final stretch, a Fujimori-Humala runoff—described months earlier by Nobel laureate Mario Vargas Llosa as a choice “between AIDS and terminal cancer”—had been considered a low-probability event. Both were flawed candidates with dubious democratic credentials. Humala, whose family espoused a racist doctrine called *ethno-cacerism*, had shown little commitment to liberal democracy. As a young military commander in the early 1990s, he was accused of serious human-rights violations in Madre Mía in the Huánuco region of central Peru. In 2000, he led an abortive military uprising against Fujimori, and in 2005, his brother Antauro led an armed uprising in which four police officers were killed. Ollanta—then a military attaché in South Korea—initially supported the uprising (he later repudiated it). In 2006, Humala ran for president as a populist outsider “cut from much the same cloth as Venezuela’s Hugo Chávez.”² He adopted a radical antisystem discourse, describing the Toledo government as a “dictatorship” dominated by “traditional politicians”³ and calling for the nationalization of strategic industries and natural resources. Although Humala moderated considerably in 2011, his candidacy nev-

ertheless triggered intense fear among the Lima elite and much of the middle class.

Keiko Fujimori was also a flawed candidate. Her father's authoritarian government (in which she had served as first lady) engaged in massive corruption and serious human-rights violations,⁴ for which Alberto Fujimori was sentenced to 25 years in prison in 2007. Unlike the post-authoritarian right in neighboring Chile, *fujimorismo* had not renovated itself or broken with its authoritarian past. Rather, it had spent the previous decade defending Fujimori and militantly opposing human-rights trials, the Truth and Reconciliation Commission, and other forms of transitional justice. Indeed, Keiko declared that as president her "hand would not tremble" in pardoning her father.⁵ For many voters, then, a Keiko presidency meant the return of an unreconstructed *fujimorismo*—and perhaps of Alberto himself.

Explaining the First-Round Results

Why, given Peru's sustained economic boom, did Humala and Fujimori qualify for the June 5 runoff? In part, the outcome was rooted in party weakness. Peru's party system collapsed in the early 1990s and never recovered.⁶ Party identities evaporated: According to surveys, more than 80 percent of Peruvians have no partisan allegiance. By 2011, established parties such as Popular Action (AP) and the Christian People's Party had been reduced to near-irrelevance, and even the once-powerful Peruvian Aprista Party (APRA) had become a small force—based mainly in the north—that failed even to run a presidential candidate. Indeed, all five of the major presidential candidates either headed personalistic vehicles (Humala's Peruvian Nationalist Party, Fujimori's Force 2011, Toledo's Peru Possible party, and Castañeda's National Solidarity Party) or, in the case of PPK, had no actual party at all.

In a field of personalistic candidates, without stable party labels, platforms, or identities, contingent events—and the campaign itself—weigh heavily. A critical factor in the 2011 campaign was that the moderate center or center-right electorate split among three establishment candidates: Castañeda, Toledo, and PPK. Castañeda and Toledo were early frontrunners but ran poor campaigns. PPK capitalized on their mistakes, ascending from 4 percent to nearly 20 percent in the polls in early 2011. A naturalized U.S. citizen, PPK combined an image as a capable technocrat with an effective marketing campaign, which enabled him to capture a significant share of the urban middle-class vote. Yet PPK's success was confined mainly to Lima. Rather than consolidating the center-right vote, he split it, and as a result all three establishment candidates failed to qualify for the runoff (see Table 1).

Fujimori and Humala benefited from the fragmentation of the establishment candidates because each enjoyed solid minority support. *Fu-*

TABLE 2—PERCENTAGE OF LATINOBARÓMETRO RESPONDENTS WHO SAY THEY TRUST THE FOLLOWING INSTITUTIONS (2010)

	Congress	Judiciary	Political Parties	Government
Peru	14*	15*	13*	25**
Brazil	44	51	24	55
Chile	41	38	23	58
Latin America	34	32	23	45

*Lowest in Latin America

**Second lowest in Latin America

jimorismo maintained a stable core electorate of roughly 20 percent, primarily among lower-income voters who credited Alberto Fujimori with ending hyperinflation, defeating the Shining Path guerrillas, and implementing effective social-assistance programs. Humala benefited from economic discontent and anti-Lima sentiment in the interior. Although radical voters—concentrated mainly in the southern and central highlands—were a minority (according to polls, only a third of Peruvians support radical economic change), no other major candidate campaigned on the left, leaving the field open for Humala; hence, he had the backing of enough radical voters to secure a first-round plurality.

Campaign dynamics do not fully explain the first-round results, however. Despite a booming economy, a solid majority (55 percent) of Peruvians rejected the status quo in favor of two candidates from outside the democratic establishment. What explains this outcome? Are Peruvians authoritarian? Do they prefer *caudillos* to democratic institutions? The evidence for a cultural explanation is not convincing. According to the 2010 Latinobarómetro survey, support for democracy in Peru is roughly on par with the levels of support in Brazil and Chile, and on questions pertinent to liberal democracy, such as respect for the rule of law and press freedom, Peru ranks among the highest in Latin America. For example, only 33 percent of Peruvians agreed with the statement that governments may “go beyond the law in difficult situations,” compared to 38 percent of Chileans and 55 percent of Brazilians; likewise, 85 percent of Peruvians rejected the statement that “the president should control the media”—the largest share in Latin America.⁷

Where Peru stands out, however, is in the area of satisfaction with, and confidence in, democratic institutions. According to the 2010 Latinobarómetro survey, only 28 percent of Peruvians are satisfied with their democracy, compared to 44 percent in Latin America as a whole (only Mexico ranks lower). Peruvians’ confidence in political institutions is the lowest in Latin America (see Table 2 above). Indeed, Peru ranks dead last in the region in terms of public trust in Congress (14 percent), the judiciary (15 percent), and political parties (13 percent). And, whereas solid majorities of Brazilians and Chileans (and 45 percent of Latin Americans overall) say that they trust their government, only 25 percent of Peruvians do.

The persistence of widespread public discontent—despite robust macroeconomic growth—is rooted primarily in state weakness.⁸ By virtually any measure, the Peruvian state is among the weakest in Latin America.⁹ According to a 2006 report sponsored by the Inter-American Development Bank, Peru’s “bureaucratic functional capacity” ranked near the bottom in Latin America, below that of Guatemala and Nicaragua, and the country ranked dead last in terms of de facto judicial independence.¹⁰ State weakness is particularly acute in the interior.¹¹ Throughout much of the highlands, the presence of state authority is minimal; police and judicial authorities are often absent; schools, health clinics, and state bureaucracies are barely operative; and local-government officials are widely viewed as corrupt or ineffective. In the absence of a minimally effective state, even well-meaning governments routinely fail to deliver the (public) goods.

The problems generated by state weakness are not necessarily ameliorated by economic growth. Rising incomes do not enhance public security, make state bureaucracies more effective, or improve the quality of schools and public services. Indeed, the incomes of many Peruvians improved considerably in the 2000s, but in much of the interior, the quality of the state did not. As a congressional candidate from Arequipa put it:

Do you want to know why people [in my district] voted for Humala? Because they step outside their houses and things are booming. People drive by in new cars. Huge shopping malls are popping up everywhere. But their lives are still miserable. Why? Well, the street isn’t paved and their kids have lung problems because of the dust. Their kids get sick and miss school twice a week because there is no potable water or sewage. And the public school is barely operational anyway. Plus, there is no security, so they are afraid every time they leave their houses.¹²

Disaffection generated by state weakness is strongly associated with antisystem voting.¹³ State weakness generates perceptions of government corruption, unfairness, ineffectiveness, and neglect. Where such perceptions persist over time, voters are more likely to conclude that “all political parties are the same,” that “all politicians are corrupt,” or that no one in the political elite represents them. Such voters are more likely to support populist or antisystem outsiders.

Humala and Fujimori benefited from public discontent over state weakness for two reasons. First, neither belonged to the existing political establishment. Humala emerged as an antisystem outsider in 2006 and remained at the margins of the establishment thereafter. *fujimorismo* was politically ostracized after the transition in 2000. Many of its leaders were prosecuted, and others were expelled from Congress. Although an alliance with the APRA government brought *fujimorismo* closer to the political mainstream after 2006, it never became a full-fledged member of the democratic establishment.

Second, both Humala and Fujimori offered “more state.” Whereas Humala’s statist appeal was largely redistributive, Fujimori’s was rooted in her father’s presidency. As part of its counterinsurgency strategy in the 1990s, the Fujimori government effectively extended the state’s presence in the interior.¹⁴ Although this state-building was primarily security-centered, it also included significant improvements in roads, schools, and health clinics. For many Peruvians, then, *fujimorismo* was associated with greater state presence, and in some cases, with the arrival of the state.

The Second Round: Why Humala Won

The conventional wisdom during the second-round campaign was that Fujimori would win. Given that lower-income voters were split between the two candidates, urban middle-class voters were believed to be decisive. And because urban middle-class voters had benefited from the export-led growth of the previous decade, it was widely assumed that they would back the free market-oriented Fujimori over the more statist Humala. The economy—and specifically, fear of economic change—was the dominant issue within the Lima elite and was a central theme of mainstream media coverage. Most major newspapers (including the influential *El Comercio*) and television networks engaged in markedly biased coverage aimed at heightening public fear of Humala,¹⁵ which tilted the playing field in Fujimori’s favor.

Yet economic fear did not carry the day. Although the wealthy voted overwhelmingly for Fujimori, the urban middle-class vote split. Fujimori won Lima and other coastal cities, but her margin of victory was insufficient to offset Humala’s overwhelming majorities in the interior. Ultimately, much of the middle-class vote was driven not by economic fear but by *anti-fujimorismo*.

Anti-fujimorismo trumped economic fear in part because Humala moderated his appeal more successfully than did Fujimori. Guided by advisors from Brazil’s Workers’ Party, Humala charted a course toward the center in the first round, abandoning his antisystem discourse, distancing himself from Chávez (and embracing Luiz Inácio “Lula” da Silva of Brazil), backing away from constitutional-reform proposals that triggered fears of *chavismo*, and emphasizing “social inclusion” over radical economic change. After the first-round vote, Humala reconfigured his campaign team, bringing in a group of mainstream technocrats—including several economists from the Toledo campaign—who drafted a new platform that was decidedly centrist. It pledged to maintain orthodox fiscal and monetary policies and to respect Peru’s international trade agreements, while proposing to increase the minimum wage by 20 percent, expand tax revenue by 3 percent of GDP (via a windfall-profits tax on mining companies), double the coverage of Juntos (a World Bank-sponsored

conditional cash-transfer program established under Toledo), and create a new public pension for the elderly.¹⁶ To reinforce his commitment to liberal democracy, Humala took a public “Oath for Democracy” in which he swore—on the Bible, in front of prominent public figures—to respect the constitution, the rule of law, the separation of powers, human rights, and freedom of speech, and pledged to stay in office “not a minute beyond” his five-year term.¹⁷

Humala’s move to the center was successful. He gained the support of leading liberal establishment figures such as Vargas Llosa and Toledo, centrist parties such as AP and Toledo’s Peru Possible, leading human-rights groups, and a range of intellectuals and other public figures who had opposed him in the past. These endorsements—particularly those of Vargas Llosa and Toledo—enhanced the credibility of Humala’s new platform and softened his image among middle-class voters. They also transformed the *humalista* coalition, turning what had begun as a leftist outsider campaign into a broad anti-*fujimorista* front that included centrist, pro-establishment figures.

By contrast, Keiko Fujimori failed to credibly break with her party’s corrupt and authoritarian past. Years of struggle in defense of the politically ostracized Alberto Fujimori had transformed *fujimorismo* into a social movement with a relatively strong identity and subculture.¹⁸ Unreconstructed and inward-oriented, *fujimorismo* was poorly positioned to appeal to independent voters. Although Keiko attempted to distance herself from her father’s authoritarian past, asking for forgiveness for crimes committed during his government and “swear[ing] to God” that she would not pardon him,¹⁹ she was constrained by her party’s commitment to the imprisoned ex-president. *Fujimoristas* refused to recognize that Alberto Fujimori had been responsible for crimes, and Keiko herself insisted that his presidency was “the best in Peruvian history.”

Efforts to soften Keiko’s image were also hindered by the presence of unreconstructed *fujimoristas* and veterans of Fujimori’s government in the front lines of the campaign. For example, Martha Chávez, a hard-line *fujimorista* legislator who was reelected in 2011, openly threatened Supreme Court president César San Martín, who had presided over Fujimori’s conviction;²⁰ and Alejandro Aguinaga, who was Fujimori’s health minister when thousands of forced sterilizations were carried out on poor women, served as a high-level campaign advisor.²¹ Finally, efforts to distance Keiko’s campaign from her father’s government were belied by evidence that Alberto Fujimori remained active in directing the campaign from his prison cell.²² Ultimately, then, Keiko’s second-round moderation was half-hearted and lacked credibility.²³

In sum, notwithstanding the efforts of much of the mainstream media, anti-*fujimorismo* trumped economic fear among many urban middle-class voters. Humala’s winning electoral coalition thus combined a radical protest vote, concentrated in the interior, with a middle-class

anti-Fujimori vote, concentrated in Lima and along the coast. The radical vote helped Humala to win a first-round plurality, but it was the (pro-system) anti-*fujimorismo* vote that ultimately delivered him the presidency.

Future Scenarios

Humala's election generated considerable fear among the Lima elite. Conservative commentators warned that Humala would install a leftist authoritarian regime like that of Hugo Chávez or even that of Peruvian general Juan Velasco (1968–75). *Peru21* editor Fritz Du Bois wrote that Peru would join an Andean “axis of evil” led by Chávez,²⁴ while *Correo* editor Aldo Mariátegui claimed that a Humala government would be “worse than Chávez.”²⁵ It was widely assumed within the conservative establishment that Humala, like Chávez (and Fujimori before him), would use plebiscitary means to undermine liberal-democratic institutions and impose a new—and more authoritarian—constitutional order.

Yet conditions in 2011 differed considerably from those in Fujimori's Peru, Chávez's Venezuela, or in Bolivia and Ecuador in the early 2000s. First, there was no crisis. Although many Peruvians were unhappy with the status quo, the kind of deep economic or political crisis that induces elites and masses to accept large-scale risk or radical change was absent.²⁶ Indeed, surveys showed that roughly two-thirds of Peruvians opposed radical change. Unlike Chávez or Evo Morales of Bolivia, then, Humala did not win a mandate for radical change. Not only did Humala refrain from waging an antisystem campaign in 2011, but his alliance with leading establishment figures was essential to his second-round victory.

A radical or authoritarian turn would also face opposition from a range of important societal actors, including a robust private sector, foreign investors, nearly all media, the Catholic Church, and Congress. Humala's Win Peru coalition won only 47 of 130 seats in Congress; the rest are held by centrist or right-wing parties. Peru's private sector is considerably stronger than in previous decades, and its economy far more dependent on foreign investment. Hence, a radical turn would risk generating broad public opposition, throwing a booming economy into crisis, and triggering an opposition countermobilization that could imperil—and even put a premature end to—Humala's presidency.

Finally, the regional context differed markedly from that of 2006. When Humala first ran for president, Chávez was at the peak of his power and influence. The Venezuelan economy was growing, oil revenue was peaking, and the election of Evo Morales in Bolivia in 2005 (and soon thereafter, of Rafael Correa in Ecuador and Daniel Ortega in Nicaragua) generated momentum for the *chavista* project. At the same time, the successes of the Lula government were not yet fully evident. Five years later,

the Venezuelan economy was in serious crisis and Chávez's prestige and regional influence were waning. At the same time, the political and economic success of the Lula government increased the attractiveness of the Brazilian model. The changing regional balance of influence was made manifest by the decision of new left-leaning governments in El Salvador and Paraguay to eschew the *Chavista* path for a moderate one. Surveys in Peru also show an overwhelming preference for the Lula model.²⁷

Given the potential cost of a radical turn and the growing attractiveness of the Brazilian model, a Venezuela-like scenario appears unlikely. An authoritarian turn would run a significant risk of failure—and perhaps even a fall from the presidency, as occurred in the cases of Jorge Serrano in Guatemala (1993), Lucio Gutiérrez in Ecuador (2005), and Manuel Zelaya in Honduras (2009). Despite Humala's radical background, then, it is quite possible—indeed, likely—that he will pursue a more moderate path.

Three broad regime scenarios are thus possible under a Humala presidency. The first is a regime crisis. The most direct route to such a crisis would be a presidential power grab, probably via plebiscitarian means. If such an initiative succeeded, the country would likely slide into competitive authoritarianism, as occurred in Peru under Fujimori, Venezuela under Chávez, and, to lesser degrees, Ecuador under Correa and Bolivia under Morales. As noted above, such an authoritarian turn is unlikely, but given Humala's illiberal past and the weakness of Peru's democratic institutions, it cannot be ruled out. A regime crisis might also be triggered by the conservative elite. Elite hostility toward Humala—reinforced by populist experiments elsewhere in the region—remains intense. During the second round, much of the establishment media threw aside all pretense of professionalism and campaigned actively against Humala, creating a highly polarized climate. If such hostility persists, polarization between pro- and anti-Humala forces could generate an escalating conflict and an institutional crisis. For example, if polarization forced centrist parties (such as Toledo's Peru Possible) into an alliance with right-wing forces, and if a united opposition bloc gained control of Congress, the risk of severe executive-legislative conflict—and perhaps a constitutional crisis—would increase markedly.

The second and best-case scenario would look more like Lula's Brazil. In such a scenario, Humala's Win Peru would forge a center-left governing coalition with Peru Possible and other small centrist parties. Such a multiparty coalition would provide the new government with a legislative majority, thereby enhancing governability and enabling Humala to implement his social agenda within a representative democratic framework. In effect, centrist parties would provide legislative support for redistributive social policies in exchange for Humala's continued commitment to work within the parameters of liberal democracy and a market-based economy. Such a pact would reinforce democratic institu-

tions while attacking some of the causes of the public discontent that—as the 2011 election made clear—currently threatens those institutions. Given Peru’s high growth rates and record profit margins, the resources for such a (vaguely social-democratic) project clearly exist.

Yet there are reasons to be skeptical about the prospects for a Brazil-like scenario. Three factors that were critical to Lula’s success in Brazil are weak or absent in Humala’s Peru: an effective state, a strong governing party, and experienced democratic leadership. With a notoriously weak state and a virtually nonexistent governing party, even the most skilled democratic leader would face serious challenges in implementing socioeconomic reform in Peru. For Humala, who has never held elected office and has little experience with democratic institutions, the challenges will be even steeper.

A third scenario—and the most likely one—is a mediocre government. On the one hand, Humala appears to be charting a moderate course, broadly modeled on the Lula government. If he does, the regime will likely survive, becoming the longest-lived democracy in Peruvian history. On the other hand, due to the weakness of Peru’s state institutions, the difficulties of governing without a real party, and the inexperience of Humala and many of his allies, even well-intentioned efforts to replicate the Lula model are likely to result in a relatively poor copy. In that event, Peru’s democracy may endure, but so, too, will its fragility.

NOTES

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1. Maxwell Cameron, “The Left Turn That Wasn’t,” in Steven Levitsky and Kenneth M. Roberts, *The Resurgence of the Latin American Left* (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 2011), 375–98.

2. Cameron, “The Left Turn That Wasn’t,” 376.

3. *La Republica*, 25 March 2006. See also Cynthia McClintock, “An Unlikely Comeback in Peru,” *Journal of Democracy* 17 (October 2006): 95–109.

4. In its 2004 Global Corruption Report, Transparency International called Fujimori the seventh most corrupt leader in modern history. Among the most serious human-rights violations was the paramilitary killing of nine students and a professor at La Cantuta University in 1992.

5. *El Comercio*, 9 June 2008.

6. Martín Tanaka, *Los espejismos de la democracia: El colapso del sistema de partidos en el Perú* (Lima: Instituto de Estudios Peruanos, 1998); Steven Levitsky and Maxwell Cameron, “Democracy Without Parties? Political Parties and Regime Change in Fujimori’s Peru,” *Latin American Politics and Society* 45 (Autumn 2003): 1–33.

7. The survey data in this paragraph and the following one can be found in Corporación

Latinobarómetro, *Informe Anual 2010* (Santiago de Chile, December 2010), 26, 37, 34, 40, 74; available at www.latinobarometro.org/latino/LATContenidos.jsp.

8. See Scott Mainwaring, "The Crisis of Representation in the Andes," *Journal of Democracy* 17 (July 2006): 13–27.

9. See Hillel David Soifer, "The Origins and Persistence of State Power in Latin America," unpubl. ms., Department of Political Science, Temple University.

10. Ernesto Stein et al., coords., *The Politics of Policies: Economic and Social Progress in Latin America, 2006 Report* (Washington, D.C.: Inter-American Development Bank, 2005), 69 and 88.

11. Soifer, "The Origins and Persistence of State Power in Latin America."

12. Author's interview with Guido Lucioni, 16 June 2011.

13. Mainwaring, "Crisis of Representation in the Andes"; and Carlos Melendez, "Perú: Las elecciones del 2011. Populistas e integrados. Las divisiones políticas en un sistema 'partido,'" in Manuel Alcántara Sáez and María Laura Tagina, eds., *Elecciones y Política en América Latina* (Rosario: Homo Sapiens, forthcoming).

14. See Philip Mauceri, "State Development and Counter-Insurgency in Peru," in Paul B. Rich and Richard Stubbs, eds., *The Counter-Insurgent State: Guerrilla Warfare and State Building in the Twentieth Century* (London: St. Martin's, 1997), 152–74.

15. See David Rivera, "Podrá el Grupo Comercio Detener a Ollanta Humala?" *Poder*, 27 April 2011.

16. Campaña Ollanta Presidente, "Lineamientos Centrales de Política Económica y Social para un Gobierno de Concertación Nacional," May 2011.

17. *La Republica*, 15 May 2011.

18. See Adriana Urrutia, "Hacer Campaña y Construir Partido: Fuerza 2011 y Su Estrategia Para (Re)Legitimar al Fujimorismo a Través de su Organización," *Argumentos* 5 (May 2011), available www.revistaargumentos.org.pe.

19. *Peru21*, 25 April 2011 and 18 April 2011.

20. *Diario16*, 16 April 2011.

21. *La Republica*, 6 March 2011.

22. *La Republica*, 15 May 2011 and 18 May 2011.

23. According to surveys, nearly two-thirds of Peruvians believed that Fujimori would pardon her father if elected; see *La Tercera*, 24 May 2011.

24. *Peru21*, 11 May 2011.

25. Personal communication, 31 May 2011.

26. On the role of crisis in inducing support for radical change, see Kurt Weyland, *The Politics of Market Reform in Fragile Democracies: Argentina, Brazil, Peru and Venezuela* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2002).

27. According to one postelection survey, 61 percent of Peruvians wanted Humala to be "more like Lula," whereas only 11 percent wanted him to be "more like Chávez," *El Comercio*, 19 June 2011, A8.