



Populism and Democracy: Political Discourses and Cultures in Contemporary Ecuador

Author(s): Carlos de la Torre

Source: *Latin American Perspectives*, Vol. 24, No. 3, Ecuador, Part 1: Politics and Rural Issues (May, 1997), pp. 12-24

Published by: [Sage Publications, Inc.](#)

Stable URL: <http://www.jstor.org/stable/2634095>

Accessed: 29/04/2011 19:15

Your use of the JSTOR archive indicates your acceptance of JSTOR's Terms and Conditions of Use, available at <http://www.jstor.org/page/info/about/policies/terms.jsp>. JSTOR's Terms and Conditions of Use provides, in part, that unless you have obtained prior permission, you may not download an entire issue of a journal or multiple copies of articles, and you may use content in the JSTOR archive only for your personal, non-commercial use.

Please contact the publisher regarding any further use of this work. Publisher contact information may be obtained at <http://www.jstor.org/action/showPublisher?publisherCode=sage>.

Each copy of any part of a JSTOR transmission must contain the same copyright notice that appears on the screen or printed page of such transmission.

JSTOR is a not-for-profit service that helps scholars, researchers, and students discover, use, and build upon a wide range of content in a trusted digital archive. We use information technology and tools to increase productivity and facilitate new forms of scholarship. For more information about JSTOR, please contact support@jstor.org.



Sage Publications, Inc. is collaborating with JSTOR to digitize, preserve and extend access to *Latin American Perspectives*.

<http://www.jstor.org>

Populism and Democracy

Political Discourses and Cultures in Contemporary Ecuador

by
Carlos de la Torre

In light of the ongoing resilience of populism in Ecuadorian politics, it should come as no surprise that both political elites and social scientists there have long debated the relationship between populism and democracy (Burbano and de la Torre, 1989; Paz y Miño, 1992). Modernizing elites have argued that populism's rhetoric and style of political mobilization pose dangers to democratic institutions. They have constructed populist subjects as the "Other"—the negation of the "modern and rational" political subjects that they aim to forge. Populist leaders, on the contrary, have seen themselves as the embodiment of the democratic ideal. They conceive of democracy as mass mobilization and the occupation of public space rather than as respect for procedures and the rule of law. These conflicting understandings—which to an extent reproduce debates on formal and direct democracy—suggest the need for a deeper understanding of the uneasy relationship between populism and democracy in Ecuador. We need to examine the ways in which Ecuadorian democracy has been constructed and imagined.

Undoubtedly, populism has been the most important political phenomenon in contemporary Ecuadorian history. José María Velasco Ibarra inaugurated mass populist politics in Ecuador and dominated the country's politics for four decades, gaining the presidency on five separate occasions (1934-1935, 1944-1947, 1952-1956, 1960-1961, and 1968-1972). Another populist party, the Concentración de Fuerzas Populares (Concentration of Popular Forces—CFP), was the most significant political force in Guayaquil from the 1950s to the 1970s. The likely triumph of CFP leader Asaad Bucaram in the

Carlos de la Torre is an assistant professor of sociology at Drew University, Madison, New Jersey. He has published *La seducción velasquista* (Quito: Facultad Latinoamericana de Ciencias Sociales/Libri-Mundi, 1993). He thanks the following persons for their comments and suggestions: Felipe Burbano, Robert Dash, Hyun Kim, Charles Tilly, Jonathan Reader, and the reviewers for *Latin American Perspectives*. This research was partially funded by a Drew University Summer Faculty Research Grant.

1972 presidential elections helped to precipitate the military coup led by General Guillermo Rodríguez Lara in that year. Despite the economic and social modernization achieved by Ecuador under military rule (1972-1979) and recently enacted legislation to foster a party-based political system, populism continues to be an important political force. The styles of mobilization, political culture and discourse, and rhetoric created by past populist leaders continue to pattern Ecuadorian politics.

This article explores the paradoxes of populism and democracy in contemporary Ecuador. The first section briefly examines how different forms of mediation between the state and civil society—particularly citizenship and *lo popular*—have been constructed in Ecuador. The second section analyzes Abdalá Bucaram's populist politics, focusing on his campaign style and discourse. The third section discusses the modernizing elites' project of creating new political subjects in the context of the transition to elected civilian regimes, and the conclusion reflects on the ambiguous relationship between populism and Ecuadorian democracy.

MASS POLITICS, POPULISM, AND CITIZENSHIP

Mass populist politics in Ecuador originated in the 1930s and 1940s under the leadership of José María Velasco Ibarra. Ecuador was not at that time experiencing import-substitution industrialization, but even so the oligarchical order was in crisis as it was elsewhere in Latin America. Social actors such as the middle class (which had grown as a consequence of urbanization and state expansion), artisans, and a small proletariat were demanding political inclusion.

Velasco Ibarra took politics out of the salons and cafés of the elites and into the public plazas. He toured most of the country delivering his message of political incorporation through honest elections. His followers responded to his appeals by occupying plazas, demonstrating for their leader, intimidating opponents, and—when they felt that the demonstration of their will at the polls had been mocked—staging insurrections and rebellions. Velasco Ibarra, for his part, did not always respect democratic institutions. He assumed temporary dictatorial powers on several occasions, abolishing the constitutions of 1935, 1946, and 1970 with the assertion that they limited the general will of the people, which he claimed to embody.¹

Velasquismo expanded the Ecuadorian electorate from 3.1 percent in 1933 to 16.83 percent in 1968, but most citizens remained excluded by literacy requirements. This restricted franchise has led Rafael Quintero (1980) to question the characterization of Velasquismo as a form of populism, but, as

Maignushca and North (1991) have argued, his analysis failed to differentiate between Velasquismo as an electoral phenomenon and Velasquismo as a broader social and political movement. The novelty of Velasquismo was to inaugurate a political style wherein mass meetings, crowd actions, and self-recognition in a moralistic, Manichean political rhetoric became more important than narrowly restricted representative political institutions.

These two distinct forms of political participation in Ecuador—mass mobilization and limited citizens' participation in democratic institutions—illustrate how different mediations between the state and civil society have historically been constructed. Guillermo O'Donnell (1979) has distinguished three mediations between the state and civil society in Latin America: the nation, citizenship, and *lo popular*. As in other Latin American countries, citizenship in Ecuador has tended to be restricted and to give priority to political and social over civil rights; hence the nation and *lo popular* have become the principal links between state and civil society.

The nation refers to the network of solidarities of the “we,” as distinct from the “they” that constitutes other nations (O'Donnell, 1979: 288). Citizenship, in Charles Tilly's (1994: 5) definition, comprises the “rights and mutual obligations binding state agents to a category of persons defined exclusively by their legal attachment to the same state.” The struggle for and establishment of citizenship rights goes hand in hand with the rule of law and hence with the building and strengthening of liberal democratic institutions. The appeal to *lo popular* is simultaneously a rhetoric and a style of political mobilization. Populist rhetoric radicalizes the emotional element common to all political discourses (Alvarez Junco, 1987). It constructs politics as the moral and ethical struggle between the people and the oligarchy, the former being negatively defined as all who are not the latter. Given their suffering, the people are the incarnation of the authentic nation—the good, the just, and the moral—and they confront the oligarchy, representing the inauthentic, the foreign, the evil, the unjust, and the immoral. The inherent ambiguity of these terms means that precisely who is included and excluded by them varies across different experiences. Velasco Ibarra defined inclusion and exclusion politically. The people were constructed as the excluded, those whose electoral will was constantly mocked by fraud perpetrated by the Liberal oligarchy.

Populist discourse transmutes politics into a struggle for moral values that excludes the possibility of compromise or dialogue with the opponent. Populism thus has an ambiguous relation to liberal democratic procedures. Although it incorporates people previously excluded from the political system, its inherent moralism, personalism, and authoritarianism run counter to liberal democratic institutions.

Populism is part of the political tradition that George Mosse, describing certain movements that have rejected representative institutions in favor of a democracy of the masses in which the people govern directly, has called a “new political style.” Populist politics are characterized by personalism and identification with a powerful charismatic leader: “The leader symbolizes the people; he expresses the ‘general will’—but such a democracy meant that, instead of representative assemblies, a new secular religion mediated between people and leaders, providing, at the same time, an instrument of social control over the masses” (Mosse, 1980: 160). This secular religion or political liturgy is based on crowd action (Alvarez Junco, 1994). Crowds directly occupy public spaces to demand political participation and incorporation. At the same time, they are used by their leaders to intimidate adversaries. Mass meetings become political dramas wherein people feel themselves to be true participants in the political scene. Such ceremonies create common identities and an ordered universe. They are cemented by symbolic actions—“episodic, as in public festivals, and more permanently in the formation of special groups” (Mosse, 1975: 12-13).

In Ecuador, the weakness of political parties since Velasco’s time and the continuing inability of liberal democratic institutions to provide a sense of participation and of belonging to the political community have contrasted with symbolic political participation through populist, non-parliamentary politics. Velasquistas, Cefepistas, and contemporary Abdalistas have symbolically staged mass dramas wherein populist identities have been created and re-created, providing their followers with a strong sense of participation. The main legacy of Velasquismo, then, has been a style of political mobilization and a rhetoric that link the state and civil society through mechanisms that do not correspond to the rule of law or to liberal democratic procedures.

ABDALÁ BUCARAM’S POPULISM

Abdalá Bucaram is the latest expression of Ecuadorian populism. He has had a strong presence in the most recent phases of electoral politics, and his image has been a catalyst for the generation of collective identities. His political career has been a convoluted one. In 1983 he split from the CFP and founded his own party, the Partido Roldosista Ecuatoriano (Ecuadorian Roldosista Party—PRE), named for the deceased president Jaime Roldós. In 1984 he was elected mayor of Guayaquil. Despite a series of political scandals, charges of embezzlement, and a brief incarceration for alleged drug trafficking in Panama, he has presented strong challenges as a presidential candidate in two elections.²

In interviews and televised public appearances Abdalá Bucaram presents himself as a new Messiah, arguing that belief in him will bring redemption. His political messianism is conveyed through a rhetoric that constructs rivals as enemies who have to be destroyed. Since he incarnates virtue and moral redemption, his enemies represent sin and misery. Bucaram professes to be struggling against the oligarchy, which he defines in moral terms: "The oligarchy is an amorphous entity, an insensitive and exploitative system, an anti-Christian system. . . . I think that the oligarchy is everywhere" (Bucaram, 1990: 24). This omnipresent entity, however, is incarnated in concrete personalities: rival politicians. Thus, in the 1988 elections, Bucaram presented himself as the child of Christ in struggle against "the devil," Rodrigo Borja. In an interview he referred to Borja as a "lukewarm man" with "watery sperm" (Fernández and Ortiz, 1988: 158) and challenged the virility of President León Febres Cordero: "I have bigger balls than Febres Cordero. In other words I have balls, Febres Cordero does not" (Fernández and Ortiz, 1988: 159). When he refers to "oligarchical" politicians, he uses an effeminate tone of voice and gestures. He ridicules his rivals' delicate manners and tastes, which he contrasts to his own and the common people's masculine ones. The representation of the oligarchy as imitators of foreign and effeminate lifestyles is well received by his audiences. He not only reproduces existing *machista* prejudices but also encourages male manual workers' pride in their own virility as contrasted to the perceived lack of manliness among their superiors.

Of course, the feminization of adversaries is a rhetorical device commonly used by diverse sorts of politicians. Disqualification of opponents for lack of virility and efforts to show that one is the macho man par excellence reveal the values of a patriarchal and authoritarian political culture. Politicians understand the people as the submissive victims of total oppression. The passivity of the people and the formidable task of correcting their suffering call for a leader of exceptional strength and supermasculine qualities. This supermacho has to have the testicles, bravery, commitment, and courage to face extraordinary challenges. Thus politicians openly contest who possesses these virile qualities and at the same time portray adversaries as effeminate and hence incapable of being true leaders.

As I have pointed out, Abdalá, like other Ecuadorian politicians, constructs his political rivals as enemies. "Enemies are characterized by an inherent trait or set of traits that mark them as evil, immoral, warped, or pathological and therefore a continuing threat" (Edelman, 1988: 67). The demonization of rivals creates solidarities, legitimizes the actions of politicians, and provides easy and reassuring explanations for difficult social processes (Alvarez Junco, 1987: 239). This construction of politics, focusing

on the supposedly inherent qualities of individuals, makes it difficult to accept and respect liberal democratic procedures. In liberal democratic politics, adversary political groups or factions are allowed space in which to exist. They are understood as rivals who have the right to agree or disagree. Populist moralism, on the contrary, denies the opposition's right to exist. Rivals are transformed into devils whose existence jeopardizes the purity of the nation. The possibility of dissent is rejected, and an authoritarian morality is imposed.

Populist moralism not only denies the right to dissent but transforms a single individual into the embodiment of all national virtues. Thus populist leaders act as if they were the embodiment of the national will: they *are* the people, and in them "the notion of popular identity coheres" (Rowe and Schelling, 1991: 171). Since the leaders embody the people but stand above them as a moral authority, they are not accountable to any political platform but instinctively know what is the common good. Anyone who opposes their plans or policies is an enemy not only of the political leader but of the entire nation.

Abdalá's public speeches also symbolically defy the pretensions of the "white" Ecuadorian elite. He challenges their respectability by glorifying the qualities of the people, insulting his rivals, and acknowledging and accentuating his own ugliness. Sweating, screaming, shouting, cursing, and growling, he articulates manners and discourses that threaten those who consider themselves the natural leaders and moral guides of the nation. Hence the elites are repelled by him and accuse him of lacking culture, of being plebeian and rustic—in sum, unfit for the presidency. His followers, in contrast, happily accept all this. His saying that voting for him is like putting a scratch on a Mercedes Benz or throwing excrement at Guayaquil's elitist Club de la Unión symbolizes popular resistance to elite power. Most important, like those of other populist politicians his words are gratifying (Alvarez Junco, 1994: 22). His use of simple, humorous, direct, and authentically popular language without regard for the rules of oligarchical etiquette (seen by the popular sectors as obscurantist and deceptive) is well received. People see him as one of them and as someone who is proud to share their manners and to express himself in a popular style.

At the same time, Abdalá seeks to make clear that even though he is of the people he is much more than the people. In public speeches, in interviews, and in his book *Las verdades de Abdalá*, he shows in detail that his humble social origins as a child of Lebanese immigrants have not prevented him from becoming a successful lawyer, politician, and businessman and that, instead of feeling content with his personal achievements, he has chosen a life of risks and personal discomforts on behalf of the Ecuadorian poor. In his

struggle to bring redemption he claims to be willing even to sacrifice his own life: "I know that I will have a tragic death" (Bucaram, 1990: 98).

Abdalá's speeches at mass meetings also reaffirm his listeners' pride in their urban mestizo popular identity. Instead of staging his public appearances in places where "respectable" citizens gather, Abdalá goes to the *suburbios*, where those considered the "dangerous" classes live. Here the marginal, the dispossessed, the manual workers, and the servants acquire the human dignity of being at the center of the political struggle. They are the true nation, the people, and their qualities are embodied in Abdalá Bucaram, "the leader of the poor."

Abdalá's appeal is partly explained by the way he articulates the distinction between the included and the excluded in Ecuador's social structure. He defines "people" in moral and economic terms as the poor, honest, and hardworking masses, in opposition to the rich and immoral oligarchy. His discursive elaboration of the vague categories of "people" and "oligarchy" attests to the increasing urbanization and dependent capitalist development of Ecuador. This process has not resulted in full proletarianization (Pérez Sáinz, 1986: 76). Descriptive terms such as "informal sector" and "family strategies of survival" illustrate the economic insecurity of most members of the popular sectors. Even industrial workers rely on various strategies to make up for the lack of adequate family wages (Pérez Sáinz, 1985). Their exclusion and poverty are often blamed on unfair privileges and unequal access to economic goods.

Alain Touraine (1989) has argued that in Latin America an important dimension of the struggle between the included and the excluded is cultural and symbolic. Those who consider themselves "civilized and cultured" abhor Abdalá's words and political style; the excluded masses identify with his challenge to the symbols of their exclusion. His mass meetings are events in which existing social hierarchies are challenged and transgressed. The elites' manners, cultural political symbols, and hierarchies of space are contested and resisted. For a moment, as in Bakhtin's (1984) carnival, reality seems upside down. The powerful are depicted as effeminate, corrupt, and immoral. The powerless become the essence of the true Ecuadorian nation. These meetings give the symbolic dignity of humanity to those who are always marginalized and exploited.

But while Abdalá Bucaram's discourse temporarily turns the world upside down, it does not challenge existing social hierarchies—in the end, it legitimizes them. Capitalism is never questioned. Class inequalities are understood as the result of the corrupt practices of evil, immoral, and antinational politicians and businessmen. Instead of aiming for the self-constitution of

autonomous and deliberating citizens, Abdalá asks his followers to trust him, to delegate power to him. He thus incarnates the best and the worst qualities of Ecuadorian urban mestizo culture. On the one hand, there is his pride in mestizo popular identity, his resistance to the elites' claims of moral superiority, but on the other there is his machismo, his intransigence, his lack of respect for the rights of others. Finally, his silence on indigenist issues reveals the separation between the mestizo and Indian worlds. Like many other Ecuadorian politicians, he holds racist views and cannot understand the Indians' demands.

THE REPUGNANT "OTHER"

Abdalá's strong presence on the political scene has allowed modernizing intellectuals and politicians to define their own identity by constructing images of what modern political subjects should be. The elite—technocrats, politicians, and intellectuals—formed around the growth of the state apparatus in the 1960s and 1970s had devised a project of antioligarchical capitalist modernization. They envisioned an Ecuador in which, in former President Osvaldo Hurtado's (1988: 337) words, the socially and politically dominant hacienda system would be replaced by an urban capitalist society. This new society would require a different system of political domination, one based on strong political party competition (Hurtado, 1988: 330). Ecuador's recent transition to elected civilian regimes has provided these elites with an opportunity to design what they consider to be a modern political system.

Ecuador's "transition to democracy" (1976-1979) was envisioned not simply as a return to elected civilian regimes but as the political complement of the economic and social modernization achieved during the military regimes of the 1970s.³ To design new political institutions, the military government appointed three commissions composed of representatives of political parties, employers' associations, labor unions, and other organized groups. The commissions enabled modernizing antioligarchical technocrats and politicians to legislate a new system of political domination.

The project of creating an electoral political system has been somewhat successful. Ecuador is experiencing its longest phase of elected civilian regimes to date. From 1979 to the present, five presidents, each of a different ideological persuasion, have succeeded one another in office.⁴ Even so, political parties continue to be weak and numerous. Far from reducing the number of presidential challengers, each election has brought an increase in their numbers: six in 1978, nine in 1984, ten in 1988, and twelve in 1992.

Personalism and populism continue to characterize political struggles. Public opinion surveys indicate a lack of confidence in political parties, politicians, and politics in general (Isaacs, 1991).

The sobering reality of Ecuador's political system is that citizens typically do not behave according to the expectations of the modernizing intellectuals and politicians who designed the new political institutions. But this reality has allowed the latter to define their own identity by constructing images of the nonmodern or antimodern and repugnant "Other." Thus modernizing politicians in Ecuador have used the actions and words of Abdalá Bucaram to differentiate what they perceive as their own "positive, modern, and rational" politics from "negative, irrational" populist politics. Populist leaders and their followers have been constructed as outsiders to the rule of reason and democracy.

To put an end to the "nonrational," "emotional," and "dangerous" political practices of populism, modernizing political elites have argued for the strengthening of ideologically based political parties. But their project expresses an elitist view of populist followers as "irrational masses" who have to be educated and eventually transformed into "modern" and "rational" political subjects. Populist followers are told that instead of shouting in public plazas in response to demagogues they should "rationally" consider how to vote in front of their television sets in the solitude of their homes. This is a quixotic task indeed, but it is one that allows modernizing elites to prescribe how politics should be conducted and reinforces their self-designation as the moral guides of "modern" Ecuador.

CONCLUSIONS

Ecuador's relatively long recent phase of elected civilian regimes does not mean that democracy has become the norm, even in its more restricted definition as the respect for procedures of political elites. In light of the persisting importance of clientelism in establishing and maintaining political support (Menéndez-Carrión, 1986), it is not surprising that political elites still view "the state as an entity set off against society to be either captured, in whole or in part, and/or to be defended against" (Malloy, 1987: 243). The Ecuadorian state is seen as booty, and political elites are more interested in capturing state resources than in respecting democratic procedures once in power (Conaghan, 1987). Civilian regimes, ruling in a conjuncture of economic crisis, have applied neoliberal policies that have further increased social inequalities and political instability. Thus far, the military has abstained

from intervening. Its respect for civilian regimes, however, cannot be explained solely by a new democratic conversion. More likely, as Anita Isaacs (1993) has argued, it has been deterred by economic crisis and by the dangers that intervention would present to professional unity. The military has not been subordinated to civilian rule but maintains a series of privileges and veto powers that, in Brian Loveman's (1994) apt characterization, make Ecuador at best a "protected democracy."

Ecuador's failure to realize the (restricted) conception of democracy envisioned by its political elites should make us reconsider the validity of a vision of democracy as respect for procedures tout court (Franco, 1993). It is time to rethink the implementation of democratization projects that ignore the historical-structural and/or systemic bases for democracy. The challenge is to articulate economic and social policies that address the legacies of dependency and underdevelopment (Cueva, 1988b), to build political institutions that transcend restricted (though important) liberal norms, and to provide spaces for the development of autonomous and deliberating citizens (Menéndez-Carrión, 1992).

Populist politics continues to challenge the restricted character of Ecuadorian democracy and the project of creating modern political subjects. Given the ways in which the prevailing conceptions of democracy and citizenship silence and exclude the popular sectors, populist followers continue to seek empowerment by staging mass dramas and occupying public spaces in the name of their leader. The continuing relevance of the rhetoric and mobilization style that appeal to *lo popular* has not been matched by a strengthening of citizenship rights. As in the past, citizenship has been reduced to political rights.⁵ Civil rights are not respected, and neoliberal economic policies have further reduced limited entitlements to social rights.

I have here presented a research agenda on the relationship between democracy and populism and a critique of the modernizing elites' project of democratization. To understand the paradoxical relationships between, on the one hand, citizenship, the rule of law, and democratic procedures and, on the other, populist Manichean rhetoric and mass mobilizations, historical studies are needed that analyze how the different mediations between state and civil society have been created. I have also shown that projects of democratization that appeal to supposedly universalist conceptions of rationality tend to silence and exclude large segments of the population. "It is important to remember that subjects are constituted through exclusions, that is, through the creation of a domain of deauthorized subjects, presubjects, figures of abjection, populations erased from view" (Butler, 1995: 47). Yet despite elite wishes that the excluded "Other" would adapt and conform to proper notions

of modern and rational politics, these subjects have resisted such impositions. Even though resistance has been articulated through the delegation of power to authoritarian leaders, populist politics presents an important example of how the marginal "Other" resists elitist "democratic" politics.

NOTES

1. The analysis of Velasquismo has been quite controversial among Ecuadorian social scientists (see, e.g., Cueva, 1988a; de la Torre, 1993, 1994; Maiguashca and North, 1991; Menéndez-Carrión, 1986; and Quintero, 1980).

2. Abdalá Bucaram received 17.61 percent of the votes in the January 1988 presidential elections and 46 percent in the May 1988 runoff. In the 1992 elections he captured 22 percent of the votes. He has also announced his candidacy for the 1996 elections.

3. For analyses of the nationalist reformist military government of Rodríguez Lara (1972-1976) and the conservative and more repressive military regime of the *triumvirato* that followed (1976-1979), see Argones (1985), Conaghan (1988), Isaacs (1993), and Quintero and Silva (1991). For studies of Ecuador's pacted transition to democracy, see Argones (1985), Conaghan (1988), Hurtado (1988), and Isaacs (1993).

4. Jaime Roldós, 1979-1981; Osvaldo Hurtado, 1981-1984; León Febres Cordero, 1984-1988; Rodrigo Borja, 1988-1992; and Sixto Durán Ballén, 1992-present.

5. Quintero and Silva (1991: 265-266) assert that under the new constitution the electorate has increased by 23.3 percent overall and by 45 percent in the highland provinces in which the Indian and peasant population is concentrated.

REFERENCES

- Álvarez Junco, José
 1987 "Magia y ética en la retórica política," pp. 219-271 in José Álvarez Junco (ed.), *Populismo, caudillaje y discurso demagógico*. Madrid: Centro de Investigaciones Sociológicas.
 1994 "El populismo como problema," pp. 11-39 in José Álvarez Junco and Ricardo González Leandri (eds.), *El populismo en España y América*. Madrid: Editorial Catriel.
- Argones, Nelson
 1985 *El juego del poder: De Rodríguez Lara a Febres Cordero*, Quito: Corporación Financiera Nacional.
- Bakhtin, Mikhail
 1984 *Rabelais and His World*. Bloomington: Indiana University Press.
- Bucaram, Abdalá
 1990 *Las verdades de Abdalá*. Quito: Editorial El Duende.
- Burbano, Felipe and Carlos de la Torre (eds.)
 1989 *El populismo en el Ecuador: Antología de textos*. Quito: ILDIS.
- Butler, Judith
 1995 "Contingent foundations," pp. 35-57 in Seyla Benhabid, Judith Butler, Drucilla Cornell, and Nancy Fraser, *Feminist Contentions: A Philosophical Exchange*. New York and London: Routledge.

- Conaghan, Catherine
 1987 "Party politics and democratization in Ecuador," pp. 145-167 in James M. Malloy and Mitchell A. Selligson (eds.), *Authoritarians and Democrats: Regime Transition in Latin America*. Pittsburgh: University of Pittsburgh Press.
 1988 *Restructuring Domination: Industrialists and the State in Ecuador*. Pittsburgh: University of Pittsburgh Press.
- Cueva, Agustín
 1988a *El proceso de dominación política en el Ecuador*. Quito: Editorial Planeta.
 1988b "Interpretaciones de la democracia en América Latina: Algunos temas y problemas," pp. 27-77 in Agustín Cueva, *Las democracias restringidas de América Latina: Elementos para una reflexión crítica*. Quito: Editorial Planeta.
- de la Torre, Carlos
 1993 *La seducción velasquista*. Quito: Facultad Latinoamericana de Ciencias Sociales/ Libri-Mundi.
 1994 "Velasco Ibarra and 'la revolución gloriosa': the social production of a populist leader in Ecuador in the 1940s." *Journal of Latin American Studies* 26 (3): 286-311.
- Edelman, Murray
 1988 *Constructing the Political Spectacle*. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.
- Fernández, Iván and Gonzalo Ortiz
 1988 *¿La agonía del populismo?* Quito: Editorial Plaza Grande.
- Franco, Carlos
 1993 "Visión de la democracia y crisis del régimen." *Nueva Sociedad* 128: 50-62.
- Hurtado, Osvaldo
 1988 *El poder político en el Ecuador*. Quito: Editorial Planeta.
- Isaacs, Anita
 1991 "Problems of democratic consolidation in Ecuador." *Bulletin of Latin American Research* 10 (2): 221-239.
 1993 *Military Rule and Transition in Ecuador, 1972-92*. Pittsburgh: University of Pittsburgh Press.
- Loveman, Brian
 1994 "'Protected democracies' and military guardianship: political transitions in Latin America, 1978-1993." *Journal of Interamerican Studies and World Affairs* 36 (2): 105-191.
- Manguashca, Juan and Liisa North
 1991 "Orígenes y significados del Velasquismo: lucha de clases y participación política en el Ecuador, 1920-1972," pp. 89-161 in Rafael Quintero (ed.), *La cuestión regional y el poder*. Quito: Corporación Editora Nacional.
- Malloy, James
 1987 "The politics of transition in Latin America," pp. 235-259 in James M. Malloy and Mitchell A. Selligson (eds.), *Authoritarians and Democrats: Regime Transition in Latin America*. Pittsburgh: University of Pittsburgh Press.
- Menéndez-Carrión, Amparo
 1986 *La conquista del voto en el Ecuador: De Velasco a Roldós*. Quito: Corporación Editora Nacional.
 1992 "El populismo en el Ecuador: ¿tiene sentido seguirlo 'descubriendo'?" pp. 197-213 in Juan Paz y Miño (ed.), *Populismo*. Quito: ILDIS.
- Mosse, George
 1975 *The Nationalization of the Masses*. New York: Howard Fertig.
 1980 "Toward a general theory of fascism," pp. 159-197 in George Mosse, *Masses and Man: Nationalist and Fascist Perceptions of Reality*. New York: Howard Fertig.

O'Donnell, Guillermo

1979 "Tensions in the bureaucratic-authoritarian state and the question of democracy," pp. 285-319 in David Collier (ed.), *The New Authoritarianism in Latin America*. Princeton: Princeton University Press.

Paz y Miño, Juan (ed.)

1992 *Populismo*. Quito: ILDIS.

Pérez-Sáinz, Juan Pablo

1985 *Clase obrera y democracia en el Ecuador*. Quito: Editorial El Conejo.

1986 *Entre la fábrica y la ciudad*. Quito: Editorial El Conejo.

Quintero, Rafael

1980 *El mito del populismo en el Ecuador*. Quito: Facultad Latinoamericana de Ciencias Sociales.

Quintero, Rafael, and Erika Silva

1991 *Ecuador: Una nación en ciernes*. Vol. 3. Quito: Facultad Latinoamericana de Ciencias Sociales/Abya-Yala.

Rowe, William and Vivian Schelling

1991 *Memory and Modernity: Popular Culture in Latin America*. London: Verso.

Tilly, Charles

1994 *Democracy Is a Lake*. Center for Studies of Social Change, New School for Social Research, Working Paper 185.

Touraine, Alain

1989 *América Latina: Política y sociedad*. Madrid: Espasa Calpe.